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Keynote
Speaker |
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Susanna
Siegel, Harvard University
"Cognitive
Penetrability and Perceptual Justification"
4:30 PM Young Library
Auditorium |
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Schedule
of Student Presentations
11:00
am Erin
Vallicelli
University of Kentucky, KY
Considering
the Existentially Quantified View of Perception for Multiple Perceptual
Modalities
Young
Library Auditorium
In
this paper, I consider whether or not the existentially quantified view
of perceptual experience put forth by Colin McGinn can account for the
perceptual experience of multiple modalities. I argue that when
considering the perceptual experience of both vision and touch, it
fails. I make this argument by first laying out McGinn’s view, I
continue to show that this conception of vision fails to adequately
account for the phenomenological experience of both visual and tactile
perception. As a result, McGinn’s view also cannot account for the
multiple modalities. I do not reject these views outright, but point to
ways they would need to be modified to account for the perceptual
experience of multiple modalities. After considering an objection to the
argument put forth, I further conclude that if perceptual theories are
supposed to accurately account for our perceptual experiences, then they
need to consider the experience of perceiving with multiple modalities.
12:oo
PM Julia
Krause
Johns Hopkins University, MD
An
Animal Argument for the Non-Conceptual Content of Human Perception
Young
Library Auditorium
In
The Varieties of Reference (VOR), Gareth Evans famously
introduced a level of non-conceptual (“informational”) content of
perception. The main challenge for contemporary non-conceptualism is to
maintain that non-conceptual states represent the world, i.e. have
correctness conditions, while describing these states in a way that
clearly distinguishes them from conceptual states. Typical arguments
for non-conceptual content do not pass this test—they do not supply an
interesting notion of the non-conceptual. Evans' interest in a primitive
stage of human cognitive development points to a more promising
argument, which would proceed from the premise that we share
non-conceptual perceptual abilities with certain animals. However, such
a strategy would be at odds with another central aspect of Evans'
position: he does not present a unitary account of the non-conceptual
for both conceptual and non-conceptual creatures. This problem becomes
clear in his claims that egocentric space depends on objective space,
and that non-conceptual content owes its representationality to being
input to a conceptual system.
3:00
PM Mark
Green
Stony Brook University, NY
What
does One Second Sound Like?: how durations become objects of perception
Young
Library Auditorium
Though the
experience of perceiving durations saturates human life, the discipline
of philosophy still struggles to account for how such perceptions are
possible and what specific modes of temporal data exist.
This paper demonstrates that the inherited schema of
form/content, where time lies as an empty form to be ‘filled’ by
properly sensory content, fails to account for our performance of such
elementary epistemological claims as “that clicking sound in my car is
getting faster.” Following
the failure of the form/content schema to account for direct awareness
of durational values themselves, we take up the possibility that
durations are perceived in the same manner as quantities.
Some problems with this view are discussed before looking at the
final, most uncomfortable yet convincing option: durations are perceived
qualitatively. We end with
looking at the implications that follow from the possibility of
something roughly analogous to sense-data, or qualia, of durations
themselves.
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