

The Origins of Genetic Phenomenology in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy

by Bob Sandmeyer

Introduction

One can see a marked change or development, if you will, in the model of sense-constitution articulated by Edmund Husserl following publication of his *Logical Investigations* (1900/01).¹ In this early work, Husserl describes sense-constitution according to a structural schema having two distinct components: psychic apprehension and the content of such an apprehension. Sensate data [*Empfindungsdata*] under this model have the character of non-intentional moments making up the "material" basis of any intending apprehension. Perception, for instance, animates a material basis with meaning as the ego takes up or apprehends its object sensuously. After the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl set about investigating the constitution of temporal objectivities, and these investigations led him eventually to believe that the form-matter schema remained too abstractly limited to the level of active thematizations. As a result, he developed a new "genetic" model of constitution in the teens and twenties. He sought with this new model to account for a level of passive sense-constitution occurring as consciousness constitutes itself temporally.

In this paper, I will focus on the grounds for the development of the concept of sense-constitution, paying special attention to Husserl's characterization of the data of sensation in two published works, first in his *Logical Investigations* of 1901 – most specifically in the fifth Investigation entitled „On Intentional Experiences and their 'Content'" (hereafter "*L.I.*" or "5. *L.I.*"), and second in the 1913 general introduction to phenomenology, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a*

¹ Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden.* Hrsg. v. Ursula Panzer. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke XIX/1.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984. Originally Published as *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.* Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1901. [NB: Page numbers are prefixed in this paper with the letter "A" indicating the 1901 edition of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen.*]

*Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*² (hereafter "*Ideas I*"). Though the two presentations bear a striking similarity in regards to the structural articulation of sense-constitution, their similarity belies a growing dissatisfaction by Husserl with this model in his unpublished investigations. The problems of the structural model of intentionality are most clearly articulated in Husserl's correspondence with his former Göttingen student, Roman Ingarden, during the early teens. These letters, which Ingarden first published in *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, along with other important unpublished manuscripts by Husserl will be the focus of this analysis. I will show that the issues central to both Husserl's and Ingarden spurred the development of a new "genetic" model of sense-constitution, which Husserl first introduced in his unpublished manuscripts from 1917/18 known today as *Die Bernauer Manuskripte*³ (hereafter "Bernau manuscripts").

To be clear, the question at issue here centers on the relation of sensation-data to conscious intentions under the matter-form schema of constitution. On the one hand, these data functionally "bear" a transcendent noematic sense intended in consciousness. Yet these data are also conceived as, themselves, non-intentional moments of consciousness. To put it in the words of Roman Ingarden, a subject who plays some considerable role in this paper, "where ought one to look for the data of sensation?" They are obviously not a moment of the noema, but then again they do not seem to be strictly noetic either. Their status remains ambiguous. Husserl developed a new, non-structural or genetic concept of constitution due to this problem at the root of his description of sense-constitution quite. As we shall see, he sought to develop a new model of sense-constitution in order to account for a level of sense-constitution remaining outside the descriptive range of the structural model. And though

² Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage - Nachdruck. Hrsg. v. Karl Schuhmann. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* III/1. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. Originally published as "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie." In *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 1. Halle a.d.S. (1913), 1-323.

³ Edmund Husserl, *Die 'Bernauer Manuskripte' über das Zeitbewußtsein (1917/18)*. Hrsg. v. Rudolf Bernet & Dieter Lohmar. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* XXXIII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

this new non-structural conception so radicalizes the notion of sense-constitution as to bring the static matter-form schema, itself, into question, I can show that Husserl never explicitly rejected the static model of constitution. Even after he developed the more fundamental genetic model of passive constitution, he retained the static model. This now takes the status of a preliminary level of analysis of sense-constitution.

The Static Model of Constitution: Apprehending Intention and Content of Apprehension

Roman Ingarden was the first to identify explicitly the problem of the relation of sensation-data to immanent noeses. Ingarden studied under Husserl at Göttingen, and later went on to become an especially forceful critique of Husserl's transcendental idealism.⁴ In 1914, at the time this issue of sensation-data in Husserl's model of intentionality arose, Ingarden was writing his dissertation on Henri Bergson's philosophy with Husserl as his *Doktorvater*.⁵ While engaged in his dissertation research, he closely studied the second edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and discovered a serious ambiguity there regarding the description of sensation-data. This is found specifically in the fifth investigation, "Concerning intentional experiences and their 'contents.'"⁶

Ingarden was writing a dissertation on Henry Bergson's philosophy.⁷ Given his dissertation topic, his first sustained work with Husserl centered less on this special question of sensation-data than on his attempt to form an adequate comprehension of the problem of time, specifically as this was articulated by Bergson. His central concern focused on the distinction in Bergson's writings between *la durée pure* and *le temps*. Although these two problems, i.e., (i) the problem of the relation of

⁴ Cf. Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.

⁵ R. Ingarden, "Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson. Darstellung und Versuch einer Kritik." Inaugural Dissertation. Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1921.

⁶ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl*. Hrsg. v. R. Ingarden. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 123ff.

⁷ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 121.

sensation-data to immanent noeses in Husserl's description of sense-constitution and (ii) the problem of time-consciousness generally, do not appear related, I will argue they are and intimately so. However, even Ingarden does not explicitly link the two issues together in his recollections. As we shall see, he only later came to recognize their connection years after he had left Göttingen. To treat them as integral from the first would thus ignore the evolution of an important problem in Husserl's philosophy.

As Ingarden confesses, he was initially unaware of any of Husserl's investigations into time-consciousness apart from what he could glean in the 1913 publication, *Ideas I*.⁸ Husserl's *Ideas*, First Book, which at the time (and for decades to come) was his most developed expression of phenomenological method, consciously avoids any serious probing into the problem of time and time-consciousness. This is, in fact, made explicit in §81, entitled "Phenomenological time and the Consciousness of Time." Though Husserl broaches the problem of time here, he makes it clear that this problem and its riddles remain outside the scope of his general introduction.

Time is, moreover, as will emerge from later investigations which are to follow, a title for a completely *self-contained problem-sphere* and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that our previous presentation has in a certain sense remained silent concerning a whole dimension so as to remain free from confusion, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. The "transcendental" absolute which we have laid bare by the reductions is, in truth, not the ultimate. It is something which constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely unique sense and has its primordial source in an ultimate and true absolute. Fortunately we can keep the riddles of time-consciousness out of play in our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor.⁹

Significantly, Husserl references here earlier unpublished 1905 Göttinger lectures on the theme of inner time consciousness.¹⁰ The importance of these lectures cannot be understated, since they are the entire

⁸ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 116.

⁹ E. Husserl, *Ideen I* (*Hua* III/1), 181f.

¹⁰ The lectures, "On the Phenomenology of Time," concluded a four-part course Husserl delivered in Göttingen during the month of February, 1905. The full title of the course was titled "Main Topics from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge." The specific time lectures were published in 1929 as "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." Herausgegeben von Martin Heidegger. *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und* (continued...)

general introduction into phenomenology – according to Husserl's own admission – presupposes these earlier time investigations. In 1914, however, the year Ingarden initiated his discussions with Husserl on the issue of time and time-consciousness in both Bergson's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology, Husserl's early time-lectures remained unpublished, unedited and generally unavailable. They would indeed remain unpublished until 1928. So as Ingarden worked on his dissertation with Husserl, there was really very little of Husserl's published writings by which to address the problems he found in Bergson's philosophy regarding the "nature" of original constituting time-consciousness.

And here I posed a question to Husserl in relation to original time-constituting consciousness. It is well known that this entire problem-sphere is not taken into account in the "Ideas." Husserl was somewhat surprised and asked me how I had come to know of this. I replied: "I know it from Bergson," whereupon Husserl invited me to visit him the next day. At the time, Husserl was apparently not familiar with Bergson. When I came to him the next day I found on his desk *Evolution créatrice* (in German translation). Husserl affirmed that the descriptions of "durée pure" by Bergson stood very near to his own researches in this area.¹¹

Ingarden, in other words, found in Husserl a welcome partner in his confrontation with Bergson's philosophy and his [Bergson's] conception of the problem of time and time-consciousness.¹²

But, as it turns out, Husserl also found these discussions highly influential. For they spurred him to enter upon a path that was to become the most important in his development of the problematic of time-consciousness as well as his conception of constitution. "I am convinced," Ingarden asserts, as

¹⁰(...continued)

phänomenologische Forschung 9. Halle a.d.S: Max Niemeyer, 1928, 367-498. See also: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)*. Hrsg. v. Rudolf Boehm. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* X. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. English translations included: (i) *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*. Translated by John Barnett Brough and edited by Martin Heidegger. *Husserliana Collected Works: Volume 4*. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; and (ii) *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*. Translated by J.S. Churchill and edited by Martin Heidegger. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1964.; see also (iii) "The Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness from the Year 1905." Translated by James. S. Churchill. McCormick, Peter and Elliston, Frederick A. eds. *Husserl: Shorter Works*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 277-88.

¹¹ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 116.

¹² Indeed by the time of Ingarden's dissertation work Husserl was already well aware of the "bedeviling circle, <that> original time-constituting experiences are themselves in time." E. Husserl. *Briefe an Ingarden*, 122.

he recalls their work together on these problems, "that the manifold problems of time were taken in a new and lively direction by Husserl at that time and that these at last had led Husserl to the new investigations on time in Bernau."¹³ Although Ingarden did not explicitly link the constitutional problem of sensation-data with the question of inner time-consciousness, as I have said, it is clear that Husserl began establishing this link in his writings soon after Ingarden left Germany in 1917 for Poland. The interconnection of these issues roots itself in the development of the genetic model of constitution which Husserl first brought out – albeit in an inchoate state – in the Bernau manuscripts of 1917/18. "The breakthrough to this genetic phenomenology did not occur first, as is often thought, in the lecture on "transcendental logic"¹⁴ from the Winter Semester of 1920 but rather already in the Bernau manuscripts of 1917/18."¹⁵ Thus in the years following his work with Ingarden, Husserl would quite profoundly revise his conception of intentionality. We shall turn now to trace this revision.

The Problem

One must begin where Ingarden began, with the *Logical Investigations* and Husserl's structural description of constitution expressed therein. In the 5. *L.I.* Husserl draws a strict distinction between acts as intentions and the experienced content (which is made up of sensations) of these acts. This is an essential feature of intentional consciousness, so much so that one can distinguish even presentational sensations from feelings, such as the feeling of pain or pleasure, or favor and disfavor.

Already in his discussion of the question regarding the intentionality of feelings Brentano had pointed to the equivocation here. He distinguished sensations of pain and of pleasure (feeling-sensations) from pain and pleasure in the sense of *feelings*. The contents of the first – or the former, as I could more simply say – hold for him (in his terminology) as "physical," the latter as "psychic phenomena" and belong thereby to essentially different species. This conception appears to me quite apt, though I only

¹³ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 123.

¹⁴ E. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1918-1926). Hrsg. von M. Fleischer. *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke XI*. Den Haag 1966.

¹⁵ Rudolf Bernet, „Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewußtseins in Husserls Bernauer Manuskripten.“ In *Die erscheinende Welt. Festschrift für Klaus Held*. Hrsg. von Heinrich Hüni und Peter Trawny. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, 553.

doubt whether the prevailing meaning tendency of the word "feeling" does not indicate those feeling-sensations, and whether not, then, the manifold acts we signify as feelings, owe their name to the feeling-sensations which are essentially interwoven with them.¹⁶

Events, as Husserl points out, may be clothed in a particular warmth, wherein the pleasure felt, i.e., the sensation of pleasure, is also approved and enjoyed. This complex experience nevertheless retains, at root, a structural core wherein a determinate experiencing animates some presentational content.

According to Husserl, content and experience must be sharply distinguished in the descriptive analysis of complex acts of this sort. "How, therefore, is the relation between the data of sensation and the specific noetic components to be understood?" Ingarden asks in his *Erinnerungen* "And where ought one to look for the data of sensation?"¹⁷

In the 5th *L.I.*, Husserl presents his more nuanced analysis of intentional consciousness than Brentano in his *Psychology*, distinguishing not merely the broad difference between act (*Erlebnis*) and content but also the quality and material of the act, itself. Although this latter distinction is implicit in Brentano's account of psychic phenomena, Husserl explicitly draws out this demarcation in his descriptions. Acts may differ in regards to their general positionality. In other words, the generic act-quality, i.e., as objectifying, judicative, emotive, and so on, is a broad structural feature of positional consciousness as such. Hence any objectivity intended in consciousness bears the character of this general sort of thematization taking place in consciousness. When judging, for instance, that a particular substrate *S* has a determination *p*, the sense of the object intended in this consciousness, the *Sp* thing, has the generic sense of an objectivity being-judged as such. If, on the other hand, a concatenation of manifesting appearances take a different form than anticipated by me, I naturally doubt my original apprehension of the object. For example, what I took to be an old man looks upon closer inspection more and more like a mannequin, but I am at present still not sure. The object

¹⁶ E. Husserl., *L.U.* I, V, A371 (*Hua* XX/1, 407f).

¹⁷ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 128.

intended in this sort of consciousness is one "being-doubted," or better said, it is present to consciousness as questionable. "All differences in the manner of objective relation are descriptive differentiations of the related intentional experiences."¹⁸ So while Husserl finds a generic differentiation between intentions of differing sorts which he describes as the quality of the intentional act, he sees a further specific differentiation to be made within acts of the same general kind. He distinguishes, in other words, between the generic quality of acts, let's say, as positional, and the act-matter or act-material, i.e., as acts positing this such and such.

However if we take a series of acts such as the following: the judgment *It will rain today*, the conjecture *Today it will likely rain*, the question *Will it rain today?*, the wish *Oh that it would rain today!*, and so on, then it exemplifies the possibility of identity not merely in regards to the objective relation generally but also in regards to the manner of objective relation understood in a new sense, to a manner which is prescribed therefore not by the quality of the act.¹⁹

In the 5. *L.I.*, the various generic objective relations intended in the different propositions above indicate a descriptive differentiation to be made within the quality of the act. According to Husserl, the material (*Materie*) of an act signifies a sort of content. "Content in the sense of material is a component of the concrete act-experience, which this can have in common with acts of a totally different quality."²⁰ Thus Husserl clearly distinguishes between generic act-quality and specific act-content, where by the latter he means the concrete position taking of an objectivity.

It is important to note in what way this sense of act-content is meant here, however. For as we shall see, act-material *qua* content in this sense is not identical to the sensation-data that form the content of experience, although the actual differentiation between sensation-data and act material remains ambiguous throughout Husserl's analyses in the 5. *L.I.*

Quality only determines whether what already is presentationally posited *in definite fashion* is intentionally present as wished, asked, ruled in judgment, etc. Accordingly,

¹⁸ E. Husserl, *L.U.* I, V. [A388](#) (*Hua* XX/1, 427).

¹⁹ E. Husserl, *L.U.* I, V. [A390](#) (*Hua* XX/1, 429).

²⁰ E. Husserl, *L.U.* I, V. [A387](#) (*Hua* XX/1, 426).

matter holds for us *as that in the act which above everything else confers to it the relation to an object*, namely this relation in so perfect determinateness that through the material it determines not only the objective generally which the act means, but rather more so precisely the manner in which it is meant. The material – we can say still more clearly – is the unicity situated in the phenomenological content of the act, *as what* the act *grasps out* of the particular objectivity, which properties, forms, relations it apportions to it. It pertains to the material of the act that the object of the act holds for this and no other. It is in some measure the sense of objective apprehension which founds the act (but indifferent to differentiations of quality).²¹

Any and all intentional acts exhibit this quality-matter structure. This is, according to Husserl, an essential feature of intentionality. However, this situation becomes seriously more complex because of the loose manner of Husserl's presentation in the *Logical Investigations*. For Husserl seriously equivocated in the manner by which he used the expression "content" in that work. This ambiguity affects the clarity of his entire descriptive enterprise in the *Logical Investigations*.

On the one hand, act-material *qua* content refers to the concrete positional structure of an act. On the other hand, Husserl uses content or *Inhalt* not to refer to the intentional structure of the act itself but rather to the sensation-data that are construed intentionally. In this second sense, acts *qua* apprehending experiences bestow meaning while the "content" of these act bear such meaning. As bearers of meaning, sensation-contents lack any apprehending intention.

I can find nothing more evident than the distinction which here emerges between contents and acts, more specifically, between perception-contents in the sense of presenting sensations and perception-acts in the sense of the apprehending intention. This intention in unity with the apprehended sensation makes up the complete concrete act of perception. Of course, intentional characters and likewise complete acts are also contents of consciousness in the widest descriptive sense of experiences. In this respect, all distinctions which we can establish generally are *eo ipso* distinctions of content. But within this widest sphere of that which can be experienced we believe to have found the evident differentiation between those intentional experiences in which are constituted objective intentions, namely those through immanent characters of the respective experiences, and those to whom this is not the case, hence contents which can function as the cornerstone of acts but which are not themselves acts.²²

It is clear, then, that in this widest sphere of description, the real [*reell*] "contents" of consciousness,

²¹ E. Husserl, *L.U.* I, V A390 (*Hua* XX/1, 429f).

²² E. Husserl, *L.U.* I, V A362 (*Hua* XX/1, 387).

differentiated into active construals and passive bearer of such construals, are to be sharply distinguished. Yet somehow, as Ingarden points out in his discussions with Husserl, a unity of these two radically distinct elements is somehow formed in the complete concrete act of perception. Each stands as an abstract moment of one real [*reell*] process (or experience). For Ingarden – and for us – it remains essentially unclear how these radically distinct moments can form such a unity in the concrete act of perception. Furthermore, this difficulty is made the more difficult since the acts, themselves, as is clear from Husserl's comments above, have the same being-character as inherent non-intentional moments of consciousness. The apprehending intentional acts *qua Auffassungen* are, themselves, described by Husserl as objects [*Gegenständen*] (i.e., contents of consciousness in the broadest sense) inhering in consciousness, itself. And these objects are not identical to the non-intentional sensation-data that bear the sense intended in these intentional acts. Hence the unity of act-content is made even more complicated in that both moments, construal and content, have the feature of being-experienced [*Erlebtsein*]. The full perceptual act consists, in other words, in more than merely the unity of two distinct moments, matter and form. The intentional acts and the sensation-data, which, themselves, function to form the content of those acts, are said to be posited in consciousness on the same level.

Reasons for a New Model of Constitution

Husserl, himself, was led eventually to question his own account of the matter-form structure of constitution. This occurred in the context of later studies connected to his research into phantasy-consciousness. In a research manuscript from 1909, the same time he asserts in his time-investigations that absolute self-givenness is no empty phrase,²³ he pens the following rather revolutionary observation:

I had the schema "content of apprehension and apprehension" and certainly that made good sense. But we do not have, at first in the case of perception, in it as the concrete experience, a color as the content of apprehension and then the character of apprehension which produces the appearance. And similarly we do not have, again, in

²³ E. Husserl., *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (Hua X), 343.

the case of phantasy, a color as content of apprehension and then an altered apprehension, the one which produces the phantasy-appearance. *Rather: "consciousness" consists through and through of consciousness, and sensation as well as the phantasm is "consciousness."* And there we have, first, perception as an impressional (originary) presence-consciousness, consciousness of the itself-there and the like; and <secondarily> phantasy (in the sense in which perception is opposite) as the *reproductively modified presence-consciousness*, consciousness of the as-if itself-there, of the as-if present, of the phantasy of the present.²⁴

According to Husserl's own words, the structural model of consciousness described initially in the *L.I.* seemed to him to retain its efficacy. It "made good sense." But its descriptive force over all sorts of conscious intentionalities seems now fall into doubt. Phantasy seems less a new construal wherein a determinate phantasized content bears the sense of this construal per the earlier proposed static model of constitution. Rather, here we see Husserl explicitly rejecting an extension of the schematic apprehension - content of apprehension model of constitution to a reproductive consciousness specifically and to sensation generally. Thus sensation is no longer here viewed by Husserl merely as a static understory bearing the meaning-animation of an apprehending intentional consciousness. A new conception of intentional constitution in Husserl's analyses is coming about wherein which he proposes to clarify the act-structure of a presentifying consciousness with a model that will account for the intentional structurings occurring at the most basic level of sensations as well. The determination of an object in consciousness is now seen as only partially determined by the active construals occurring in consciousness. Yet some account must be given of the functionality, so to speak, of the passive level of constitution wherein object determination originally takes place. As Professor Bernet rightly points out, "these efforts not only improved the analysis of memory, they also contained the core of a new theory of reflection according to which reflection is not an inner perception but an objectifying presentification of a lived experience that has already 'flowed away'."²⁵

²⁴ E. Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung 1898-1925*. Hrsg. von Eduard Marbach. *Husserliana* XXIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. 265-66.

²⁵ Rudolf Bernet, "Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud." In *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*. Edited by Donn Welton. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 207.

In *Ideas I*, to which Ingarden now turns his attention, Husserl presents a revised schema of constitution. Yet these revisions represent less a revamping of the apprehension - content of apprehension model of constitution than they are a recasting of that model in non-psychologistic terms. Husserl explicitly introduces the language of noesis-noema in *Ideas I* as a less equivocal substitute for the terminology that dominated his *L.I.*

But what speaks against the use of the phrase <"psychic" or "mental"> as equivalent to intentionality is the circumstance that it without question addresses and signifies in the same manner the psychic in this sense and the psychic in the sense of psychologistic (thus of that which is the object of psychology).²⁶

But this is more than a matter of mere terminology. The model of intentional consciousness described in *Ideas I* is meant in a formal manner to indicate a subjective constituting source which is itself not merely *not* psychological but, importantly, *not* mundane. Regardless of how successful this change of expression may be in achieving Husserl's goal, the revised conception in *Ideas I* retains the same problems inherent to the matter-form schema introduced in the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl maintains the ambiguity of expression in the *Ideas* when he uses *Erlebnis* in the latter text to mean, on the one hand, a totality composed of both noema and noesis and, on the other, the abstracted noetic moment of that whole.²⁷ This ambiguity leaves open to question once again the manner by which sensuous stuff constitutively forms the noema on a passive level, not as a moment of the noema *per se* but rather of the stream of consciousness itself as pre-conditional thereto.

The Bernau Manuscripts as Breakthrough to a New Level

One is left to wonder why Husserl would retain the apprehension-content of apprehension model of constitution in *Ideas I*, understanding at this stage in his development that consciousness is consciousness through and through – as he says in the 1909 manuscript concerning the descriptive inadequacy of the schema. Yet he retains this model well beyond the *Ideas*. Why? Apart from the fact

²⁶ E. Husserl, *Ideen I* (*Hua* III/1), 195.

²⁷ E. Husserl, *Briefe an Ingarden*, 126n.

that Husserl had not yet developed a viable alternative model in 1913, there are some indications to account for his consistency here in both *Ideas I* and other later texts. One should recall that in the 1909 manuscript Husserl voices his approbation of the structural model of constitution in the same breadth that he criticizes its reach. And in §85 of *Ideas I* on "Sensuous ὕλη and Intentional μορφή" he gives further indication of the limited efficacy of the static model.

We have already suggested above (when we referred to the stream of experience as a unity of consciousness) that intentionality, irrespective of its enigmatic forms and levels is also a universal medium, which in the end bears in itself all experiences even those not characterized as intentional. <We are presently confined to> a level of consideration ... which abstains from descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all temporality of experience....²⁸

The static model of constitution, in other words, represents the results of a provisional level of investigation. This begs the question, though: in what sense provisional?

Robert Sokolowski provides a fascinating and persuasive answer to this question in his excellent study *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*. The analyses taking place in *Ideas I* are consciously restricted to a structural analysis of a spontaneously thematizing consciousness. According to Sokolowski, Husserl is in essence forced to retain the model of constitution developed first in the *Logical Investigations* because "he has no other way of expressing the objectivity which is constituted by intentionality."²⁹ Only with the development of a genetic phenomenology will Husserl be able to solve the deeper problem of the constitution of the stream of consciousness, and hence address the issue of the constitutive unity of the stream of hyletic data, itself. The analyses of the *Ideas I* are higher level analyses, which presume a primary constitution to have already taken place. "We have to dig deeper into intentionality of find the laws and structures correlative to the structure of objective time. We must go beyond acts and into the primitive elements which form them, the time

²⁸ E. Husserl, *Ideen I* (*Hua* III/1), 191-92.

²⁹ Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, 142.

phases or partial intentions. The implication of this procedure is that even the deepest layers of intentionality influence the structure of objectivity as it is known to consciousness."³⁰

For Husserl, however, the problem is not merely philosophical. How, in an introduction into the method of phenomenology, can this sort of "archaeology" be pursued while fulfilling adequately the aims of the work as an introduction? The *Ideas* is meant to introduce and initiate one into the field-work of phenomenology. To attempt this sort of depth-analysis in such a text, Sokolowski asserts, would be a pedagogical mistake.

The easier higher level of subjectivity was investigated first <in the *Ideas*>, and on this level it is legitimate to distinguish between apprehension and sense data, but this provisional distinction could be made only because the deeper layer of subjectivity, the layer of temporality, was explicitly neglected in order not to confuse. While writing the *Ideas*, Husserl was already aware that the distinction between sense data and noeses could not hold if we were to probe deeper into the temporal structure of subjectivity. When he introduces this distinction, he says it is valid only if we limit ourselves to a superficial view of subjectivity, one that does not go into the deep and final region of temporality. When we do descend into the temporal sphere of subjectivity, we reach the point where apprehensions and sense data are no longer accepted as ready-made objects, nor can we treat them as distinct from one another. We realize here that both spring from a common source and both are constituted by subjective performance.³¹

Thus the apprehension-content of apprehension schematism has efficacy pedagogically and has an acceptably limited descriptive force for the specific purpose of an introduction to method. We must in the end look to the development of genetic phenomenology by which to address and make clear the "most ultimate" problems laid alluded to in the *Ideas*. Only upon the ground of the *Ideas*, however, can we make sense of the deeper analyses of a genetic phenomenology.

This development of a genetic phenomenology, as has been already suggested, is to be found

³⁰ R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 109.

³¹ R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 178. NB: It remains a question whether the passive sphere of temporal constitution, which is the precondition of any subjective performance, can itself rightly be characterized as a performance. Hence Sokolowski adds elsewhere: "Constitution of immanent objects is achieved by a performance of subjectivity; not in the sense of a distinct act which constitutes them but in the sense of a constant, creative stream of partial intentions or phases that are added together, one upon the other in retention, until a complete object arises. This spontaneity of consciousness is automatic and necessary. The process of immanent constitution replaces Husserl's dualistic schema of the *Logical Investigations*, which uses the distinction between intentional and material moments." R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 99.

first in Husserl's Bernau manuscripts. And, as I have been arguing, these manuscripts arose out of Husserl's confrontation with Ingarden on precisely these issues, i.e., the problem of the unity of construal and sensation-data, on the one hand, and the problem, on the other, of the temporal constitution of consciousness itself. As we conclude this chapter, therefore, we should turn – albeit briefly – to examine the manner by which Husserl approaches and links these problems in the Bernau manuscripts.

The Bernau manuscripts are, unfortunately, neither a completely coherent explication of the time problematic nor even a finished product. We shall briefly examine the compositional structure of this work³² later, though we will not attempt a catalog of the various models of time consciousness articulated therein.³³ At present, we will focus our eye on Husserl's explicit discussion of the apprehension-content of apprehension schema in text Nr. 9 of these manuscripts as published in *Husserliana XXXIII, Die Bernauer Manuskripte*. After this, we can turn to the Bernau manuscripts as a whole as we look for a new, more systematic presentation of the phenomenological problematic by Husserl.

Before preceding on to text Nr. 9 of *Hua XXXIII*, though, we should note that Husserl lays the ground for the analysis of the apprehension-content of apprehension schema first in text Nr. 6 of the Bernau manuscripts, which has the title "Acts as objects in phenomenological time." This particular manuscript has come under criticism by Dan Zahavi as demonstrating "an astonishing confusion, an inability to properly distinguish quite different constitutive contexts."³⁴ In his critique of the "internal object" interpretation of time-consciousness at work in his essay, Zahavi proposes that our experiences

³² For a discussion of the compositional structure of the Bernau manuscripts, see R. Bruzina's fifth chapter "Fundamental Thematics II: Time" in his book *Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. (New Haven: Yale University Press) 2004, 224-319.

³³ Cf. T. Kortooms, *Phenomenology of Time. Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers) 2002, 107-223.

³⁴ Dan Zahavi, "Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts." *Husserl Studies* 20 (2004): 106.

need not be given as *objects* in inner time-consciousness prior to reflection. Zahavi suggests rather, that "we only experience our own acts as temporal objects when we reflect."³⁵ According to the "internal object" interpretation, the absolute flow of consciousness constitutes experiences (*Erlebnisse*) as temporal objects in immanent time. One can recognize three levels of temporality, Zahavi argues, which form a "correlative and inseparable constituted unity in the original unity of time-consciousness (that is, the consciousness originally constituting immanent time-objectivity)."³⁶ In other words, the absolute flow of consciousness constitutes a unity, which is the unity of immanent hyletic perception *and* the perceived object, in this case, the perceived tone. Thus we can clearly distinguish (i) the region of transcendent temporal objects, (ii) the region of *Erlebnisse* or experiences constitutive of these transcendencies, and (iii) "the experiencing (*Erleben*) of the unities on level two,"³⁷ that is to say, the constituting acts (*Erlebnisse*) of (ii). The region of immanent *Erlebnisse*, which is the region of noetic intentionality, is – under this scheme – seen as itself the product of a deeper constitution, which is the temporal constitution of the stream of consciousness itself.

In order to properly grasp the import of Husserl's analyses here, we need to understand the underlying questions driving his analyses. On the folder containing this manuscript, there are important notes to this effect. These were likely written by Husserl's assistant, Eugen Fink, (although I have no direct evidence for this claim); and they contain two points of information. First, there is a note pointing to the manuscript Γ , which is reproduced as text Nr. 9 in *Husserliana* XXXIII. Second, there are also a few paragraphs following upon this note which articulate very briefly the main issues under discussion in text Nr. 6. These remarks are reproduced in full here:

In particular, remarks concerning whether immanent perceptions (of hyletic data) lay in the same "phenomenological time" as the perceived hyletic data. What belongs to immanent perception – whether it is the flow constituting hyletic data (the original time-

³⁵ D. Zahavi, "Time and Consciousness," 104.

³⁶ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* (Hua XXXIII), 110.

³⁷ D. Zahavi, "Time and Consciousness," 100.

objective consciousness) or whether it is only the line of primordial act-phases. How do the time of the hyletic data and the time of the original constituting stream relate together (and likewise the time of the acts as immanent unities): whether they are merely parallel, joining to form a singular order whose phases have their correlative multiplicities.³⁸

We can see from these remarks that the question in text Nr. 6 centers less on the conception of immanent perceptions as internal objects in inner time-consciousness, as Zahavi emphasizes, than on the very conception of the mode of immanent perception in inner time-consciousness. And while it is true that Husserl refers to the region of immanent perceptions as a region of objects, i.e. "acts as objects in immanent time," this is better seen as a provisional articulation rather than a definite doctrine. For it must be remembered, the Bernau manuscripts are an unfinished body of work, and any "interpretation" proposed therein has to be judged in this light. More importantly, though, is the fact that Husserl does not appear to be explicitly proposing an "internal object" interpretive model as much as he is proposing in these investigations, or at least here in text Nr. 6, a parallelization of act and object in an absolute time-consciousness.

It is with this in mind that we can now turn to text Nr. 9, where Husserl explicitly examines the apprehension-content of apprehension model of constitution. What we find in this manuscript is a very interesting delimitation of the concept of apprehension, which in many ways retains the original force of that expression as meant in the *Logical Investigations*. But now the concept is significantly broadened in scope from the narrow categorial conception proffered earlier by Husserl to every sort of object-intending. One must pay special attention here to the distinction Husserl draws between apprehending [*Auffassen*] in its broadest scope and in its narrowest.

In the end, the notion of apprehension enters into all spheres, where any objectivity is originally given, presentiated, perceived, given through induction, given in conceptual thought, on-hand, determined or indeterminate, evident or not, intuited or not intuited; but now <a distinction emerges wherein> a founded object-consciousness has its

³⁸ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* (Hua XXXIII), 410.

ground in a cognizing, an intending, a judging.³⁹

What Husserl discloses in these analyses of time-consciousness, which – it should be noted – go as far back as to Husserl's investigations of an absolute time-consciousness from 1909 cited above, is the insight that the structure of an attentional consciousness parallels the manner of givenness of its correlate. "Duration coincides with duration. There are not two time-forms which are separated, but rather one form united by coincidence, according to both directions of regard perfectly the same, identical in two-sidedness."⁴⁰

Should a transcendent object come to original givenness and be graspable for consciousness <as> originally at hand, then the giving experience must have a determinate structure, an immanent streaming of experiences. It must have an immanent stream of hyletic data and their apprehensions and with a certain specified structure flow in "phenomenological time." And from this then we can extract the following: any outer perception is an interpenetration of a double objectivation, or, as we could also say, of a double "perception." Outer perception is according to its essence a certain continual flow of "inner" perceptions, i.e., perceptions of immanent temporalities; and through this immanent flow of perception a second intentionality is at work in which the outer object comes to original givenness in its transcendence and its objective time by a "setting forth [*Darstellung*]." By this observation, immanent perception is taken as a continuum of connected, similarly identical and differentiated (continually changing) sensory data, which make up a stretch of time (of immanent time) and are given ("perceived") originally as that.⁴¹

In text Nr. 9 of the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl does fall into describing these *stretches of time* as immanent objects. Thus it is incorrect to assert, as Zahavi does, that "either consciousness is given as an object, or it is not given at all"⁴² for Husserl. In fact, the poignancy of Husserl's Bernau writings can be found in his struggle to describe the "experience" of the givenness of a constituting "intentionality" while not at the same time falling into the infinite regress characteristic of something like the "internal

³⁹ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* (Hua XXXIII), 175.

⁴⁰ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* (Hua XXXIII), 113.

⁴¹ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* (Hua XXXIII), 165.

⁴² D. Zahavi, "Time and Consciousness," 108.

object" model of inner time-consciousness criticized by Zahavi.⁴³

At this stage, we can point out what Robert Sokolowski as already suggested. Immanent consciousness is itself constituted in the process of intentionality, itself. As such, the distinction Husserl drew in the apprehension-content of apprehension model is now transposed. At the most profound level, sensation-data show themselves to be a sort of apprehending [*Auffassen*].

When we look at them <i.e., intentions and sensations> from the point of view of temporality, which is the ultimate and decisive point of view for phenomenology, sensations and intentions fall together; there are no longer two immanent objects, but only one. The distinction which Husserl makes in the *Logical Investigations*, the distinction which served there as the base of his concept of constitution, collapses when we study inner temporality, and in all logical rigor Husserl should conclude that no constitution at all has the schema "intentions-sensations." He does draw this conclusion, but only after he has found a new way of explaining objective constitution through genetic analysis.⁴⁴

If Sokolowski is correct, and Husserl does eventually conclude that no constitution at all has the schema apprehension-content of apprehension, then we can not include *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* as a example of genetic phenomenology. However, it is reasonable to believe that Sokolowski is not entirely correct. Husserl certainly retains the structural model of intentionality in many of his analyses making up the Bernau investigations. My own opinion is that Husserl never gives up the structural conception entirely, and this view is corroborated, I believe, by the material cited in this essay. But a full defense of this position this must be taken up in a different work.

Suffice it to say here that there is an interesting and profound linkage of the problems inherent to the apprehension-content of apprehension model and the "nature" of inner time-consciousness. Given broader aims, we could examine the relation between Bergson's conception of time-

⁴³ E. Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte (Hua XXXIII)*, 185. „Die phänomenologische Zeit ist die umfassende Form individueller Erlebnisse, die für das phänomenologische Subjekt gegeben sind durch andere „Erlebnisse“, sagen wir, durch ein tieferes strömendes Leben, in dem jene zeitlichen Erlebnisse in fließenden Gegebenheitsweisen „erscheinen“. Sind diese wieder Zeitlichkeiten – wie kann in der phänomenologischen Zeit die sie selbst zur Gegebenheit bringende Zeitlichkeit Platz haben? Und nun gar in einer Stufenfolge *in infinitum*. Haben wir unendlich viele Zeiten aufeinander getürmt?“

⁴⁴ R. Sokolowski, *The Formation*, 98.

consciousness and Husserl's, just as Ingarden and Husserl did in the teens. This sort of comparison would undoubtedly bear fruit, giving us a deeper understanding of Husserl's own position he developed in Bernau and beyond. And we could follow Sokolowski's lead to confirm or repudiate the view that Husserl ultimately rejected the schematism apprehension-content of apprehension. As it stands, however, we must content ourselves with this brief sketch of the these two problems as they developed conjointly in the development of genetic phenomenology in Husserl's philosophy during the teens.

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